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JUSTICE OR JUST BETWEEN US? EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE TRADE- OFF BETWEEN 
PROCEDURAL AND INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE 
IN WORKPLACE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ZEV J. EIGEN AND ADAM SETH LITWIN*
In this article, the authors examine the relationship between an 
 employer’s implementation of a typical dispute resolution system 
(DRS) and organizational justice, perceived compliance with the 
law, and organizational commitment. They draw on unique data 
from a single, geographically expansive, U.S. firm with more than 
100,000 employees in more than 1,000 locations. Holding all time- 
constant, location- level variables in place, they find that the in-
troduction of a DRS is associated with elevated perceptions of 
interactional justice but diminished perceptions of procedural jus-
tice. They also find no discernible effect on organizational commit-
ment, but a significant boost to perceived legal compliance by the 
company. The authors draw on these findings to offer a “differential- 
effects” model for conceptualizing the relationship among organiza-
tional justice, perceived legal compliance, and the implementation 
of dispute resolution mechanisms.
In this article, we examine the effects of implementation of a typical work-place dispute resolution system (DRS) on employees covered by the DRS, 
the vast majority of whom are never claimants or participants in a claim 
submitted through the DRS. This inquiry is made possible by access to a 
unique set of survey data from a large national company that, at its peak, 
employed more than 100,000 workers in more than 1,000 locations. The 
employer implemented the DRS, described in more detail below, in the 
middle of the eight- year span of the study, enabling a rare glimpse into 
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University School of Law. Adam Seth Litwin is an Assistant Professor at the Carey Business School at 
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for their helpful guidance and suggestions. While the authors’ agreement with the focal firm prevents 
them from sharing the raw data, copies of the computer programs used to generate the results are avail-
able from the first author at z- eigen@northwestern.edu.
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pre- and post- implementation perceptions of justice, organizational com-
mitment, and the degree to which employees believe the company is com-
plying with employment laws. We rely on these data and qualitative data 
collected from individuals working for the employer over a two- year period 
to present a case in which extant theory fails to explain observed outcomes. 
Specifically, theory predicts that implementation of a workplace DRS should 
improve employees’ perceptions of procedural justice, but our findings sug-
gest quite the opposite. Theory predicts that employees’ procedural justice 
perceptions and interactional justice perceptions should be harmonious. 
Our results present evidence that this does not have to be so. Implementa-
tion of the DRS in the data studied corresponded with improved perceived 
interactional justice and perceived legal compliance, suggesting a potential 
trade- off in effects associated with the DRS that was not previously concep-
tualized or documented. From this we advance a new conceptual model of 
the relationship among DRS implementation, organizational justice, and 
perceived legal compliance. We first offer some background on the existing 
scholarship examining organizational justice and the connection between it 
and workplace outcomes and behaviors. We then detail the methods, data, 
and results of the present study. We do this by explaining why DRS imple-
mentation is thought to increase procedural justice, which in turn, increases 
organizational trust, and then leads to positive outcomes associated with im-
proved organizational commitment. This proves important to understand-
ing our framework as well as the results we report.
Background
Organizational Justice
Organizational justice is the measure of how fairly employees feel treated at 
work in terms of outcomes and processes. Justice is commonly subclassified 
into three distinct subcategories: distributive, procedural, and interactional 
(Cohen- Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001; Cropanzano, 
 Prehar, and Chen 2002). Distributive justice gauges fairness or equity of out-
comes or rewards (Folger 1977). Procedural justice gauges fairness of pro-
cesses (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Lind and Tyler 1988). Interactional justice 
measures the perceived fairness of interpersonal treatment (Bies and Moag 
1986). Scholarship suggests that the more fairly employees feel they are 
treated, the more likely they are to be committed to the organization (Hub-
bell and Chory- Assad 2005) and to display what is often referred to as “orga-
nizational citizenship behavior” (Moorman 1991; Moorman, Niehoff, and 
Organ 1993; Niehoff and Moorman 1993). This behavior includes things 
like improved productivity, performance, and related measures (Greenberg 
and Barling 1996). Organizational commitment may also be measured in 
terms of reduced turnover (Spencer 1986; Byrne 2005). Conversely, when 
employees feel that their employers treat them unfairly in terms of decision- 
making or outcomes, employees are more likely to feel less committed to the 
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organization, are more likely to exit the firm, and are more likely to enact 
counterproductive work behaviors such as shirking, theft, or neglect of duty 
(Greenberg 1990; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992; Folger 1993; Green-
berg 1993; Cohen- Charash and Spector 2001). While researchers have stud-
ied all three subcategories of organizational justice, procedural justice is 
thought to be most important in understanding employee reactions to man-
agerial policies and decision- making (Naumann and Bennett 2000; Colquitt 
2001; Colquitt et al. 2001). In short, more than four decades of research 
suggests two things. First, it is important to measure under what circum-
stances and to what degree employees feel they are fairly treated at work in 
terms of all three varieties of organizational justice, but perhaps most im-
portant with respect to procedural justice. Second, employees’ perceptions 
of how fairly they are treated at work correlates with behaviors and outcomes 
of deep concern to policymakers, politicians, union organizers, employers, 
researchers, and anyone else generally concerned with workplace gover-
nance, efficiency, productivity, and stability.
Justice and Workplace Dispute Resolution
One of the most critical ways of assessing organizational justice is by evaluat-
ing how organizations address disputes (Lewin 1987; Boroff 1991; Colvin, 
Klaas, and Mahony 2006; Blancero, DelCampo, and Marron 2010). Im-
proved perceived legitimate opportunities for voice and greater perceived 
access to procedurally fair and neutral processes for resolving disputes 
should increase employees’ organizational commitment and decrease turn-
over, consistent with the “exit- voice- loyalty” trade- off (Hirschman 1970; Fol-
ger 1977; McCabe and Lewin 1992). Resolving conflict internally also 
reduces costs because litigating disputes is often more expensive than ad-
dressing them internally (Estreicher and Eigen 2010). Greater perceived 
organizational justice (particularly procedural justice) has been shown to 
correlate with less employee complaining about legal issues and less exter-
nal resorts to law (Wallace, Edwards, Mondore, and Finch 2008). Along 
these lines, internal DRSs reduce the likelihood that what might otherwise 
be a lower- cost nonlegal issue (e.g., an employee complaint of generic un-
fair treatment) gets transmogrified by a plaintiff lawyer into a higher- cost 
legal issue (e.g., alleging that the unfair treatment was a manifestation of 
employment discrimination). Private mediation and arbitration have been 
shown to result in high levels of participant satisfaction (Lipsky, Seeber, and 
Fincher 2003; Lipsky and Seeber 2006). A substantial body of literature sug-
gests that increased participation in dispute resolution processes increases 
the likelihood that claimants will regard their claims as justly addressed. 
The standard model predicts that if employees regard the DRS as procedur-
ally just, they will use it to resolve both legal and nonlegal issues, be happier, 
be less likely to exit the firm, and be more committed to the organization. 
Less clear is if, whether, and to what extent, employees regard the imple-
mentation or general availability of a workplace DRS as a fair action taken 
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by the employer when those employees are not claimants or participants in 
claims addressed by the DRS.
All three subcategories of organizational justice may be useful for assess-
ing the overall fairness of employer- implemented policies or programs such 
as a dispute resolution system, but research has suggested that procedural 
justice is the most useful and likely the most salient (Konovsky and Folger 
1991). Some have suggested that while distributive justice is useful for pre-
dicting personal- level evaluations (such as pay satisfaction or outcomes of 
specific disputes in which an individual was the claimant), procedural jus-
tice is perhaps the most useful metric for understanding organizational- level 
evaluations (like organizational commitment) (McFarlin and Sweeney 1992; 
Sweeney and McFarlin 1993). Procedural justice has been the focus of many 
studies of employer policies such as DRSs. For the purposes of evaluating 
DRSs, it seems that comfort with initiating claims and the perception that 
the DRS will address the claim in a neutral, effective, and fair way are the 
two most critical elements by which to gauge the success or failure of a DRS, 
at least as measured from the employer’s perspective (Folger and Bies 1989; 
Tyler and Bies 1990; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992). The consensus 
reached by prior scholarship is that procedural justice matters, is distinct 
from the other types of organizational justice, and is more likely to influ-
ence overall fairness judgments than distributive justice (Konovsky and Fol-
ger 1991; Greenberg and Cropanzano 2001).
Prior research theorizes and predicts a positive correlation between DRS 
implementation and improved procedural justice perceptions among em-
ployees (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler 1988; Tyler and Bies 1990; Colvin 
2003; Blancero, DelCampo, and Marron 2010). Some, however, believe this 
is true only in union environments, or when a high degree of organizational 
trust is present. Theorists disagree on whether improved perceived proce-
dural justice is even attainable in a nonunionized setting in which a DRS is 
unilaterally imposed by an employer as opposed to being the product of 
collective bargaining. In such circumstances, employee participation is nec-
essarily less collective and more individualized (Clegg 1975; Sheppard, Le-
wicki, and Minton 1992; Budd 2004). More speculation and hypothesizing 
than empirical study has transpired regarding the relationship between pro-
cedural justice and DRS implementation in the nonunion setting. The pau-
city of research may be due in part to the private nature of employment 
dispute resolution and the difficulty of gaining access to data. To the extent 
that information is reported through clearinghouses such as the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), it may be reasonably assumed that AAA data 
capture only the tip of the iceberg, may not be representative of non- available 
data, and most important for this study, never include any information 
about how employees perceive workplace metrics related to organizational 
justice before implementation of a workplace DRS. Research has focused on 
discerning the characteristics of competing dispute resolution models (Ewing 
1989), the causes for grievance initiation (Boroff and Lewin 1997), the ef-
fects of grievance activity (Ichniowski 1986), claimant win rates (Sherwyn, 
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Estreicher, and Heise 2005; Colvin 2011), disputants’ perceptions of proce-
dural justice (Aram and Salipante 1981; Fryxell and Gordon 1989), and post- 
grievance outcomes for claimants (Lewin 1987; Lewin and Peterson 1999) 
among other important aspects of employment dispute resolution. However, 
very little is known about the effects of DRS implementation on non- claimant 
and non- participant employees in the nonunion private sector.
As others have observed, in stark contrast to procedural justice, interac-
tional (or interactive) justice is the most understudied component of orga-
nizational justice (Hubbell and Chory- Assad 2005). In spite of this, it is 
expected to be an important component of organizational justice and re-
lated most closely to how employees perceive their supervisors (Tyler and 
Blader 2000). Interactional justice is distinct from procedural justice. It 
measures the extent to which employees believe their needs are taken into 
account in making decisions and the extent to which employees are pro-
vided with adequate explanations when decisions are finalized (Bies and 
Moag 1986; Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield 1999; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, 
and Taylor 2000; Bies 2001). While these issues have been examined carefully, 
sometimes even in the context of managerial trust and related concepts, few, 
if any, attempts have been made to understand the interrelationship among 
interactional justice, procedural justice, and DRS implementation. One study 
by Hubbell and Chory- Assad (2005) explored the relationship between pro-
cedural and interactional justice and managerial and organizational trust. 
They found that procedural justice is the strongest predictor of both organi-
zational and managerial trust, distributive justice predicts only managerial 
trust, and interactional justice does not predict either type of trust. Their 
study, however, was not examining an employer with any DRS in place.
The quality of the interpersonal treatment that an aggrieved employee 
receives from the decision maker and the way in which the decision maker 
enacts the formal procedure will heavily influence the aggrieved party’s per-
ceptions of whether the procedures are fair (Tyler and Bies 1988; Tyler and 
Blader 2000). Honesty, courtesy, respectfulness, and appropriate profes-
sional decorum affect the way employees regard the fairness of procedures 
implemented (Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992). Niehoff and Moor-
man (1993) developed a nine- item, validated measure of interactional jus-
tice that gauges employees’ beliefs about their managers’ interest in their 
opinions in work- related issues and how much their managers treat them 
with courtesy and respect, among other related factors. Other variations 
come into play on this measure, but for the most part, assessments of inter-
actional justice cover the same ground.
The Standard Model of DRS Implementation, Organizational Justice, 
and Commitment
Figure 1 depicts the standard model connecting DRS implementation, 
 procedural justice, and organizational commitment as theoretically and em-
pirically described in the literature. As organizational trust features in past 
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work on these constructs, it is worth briefly explaining how it fits in here. 
Organizational trust has been described as a “feeling of confidence and sup-
port in an employer,” and the belief that the employer will follow through 
on commitments (Gilbert and Li- Ping 1998). It is commonly conceptual-
ized as a product of organizational justice (Folger and Konovsky 1989; Whit-
ener 2001; Cropanzano, Prehar, and Chen 2002; Ambrose and Schminke 
2003). The logic of this concept might be cast as follows: If an employer treats 
an employee fairly, that employee is more likely to trust the employer. Organizational 
trust may also be the antecedent of organizational justice. The logic of this 
could be cast as follows: If an employer is trustworthy, the employee is more likely to 
regard the employer’s treatment as fair. This approach is plausible because of 
asymmetric information in most employment relationships. Employees 
often lack sufficient baseline information to which they may compare deci-
sions employers render, which makes it more likely that employees will rely 
on trust in assessing whether alternatives to an observed decision are less fa-
vorable than a single observable result. Therefore, as suggested by other re-
searchers, bi- directionality is likely to exist between organizational trust and 
organizational justice (Colvin, Klaas, and Mahony 2006). To accord this bi- 
directionality, in Figure 1, organizational trust is shown with double- headed 
arrows connecting to procedural justice. Organizational trust has been dem-
onstrated to be positively correlated with organizational commitment (Rup-
pel and Harrington 2000; Whitener 2001), so this is also shown in Figure 1. 
Traditionally, improved procedural justice perceptions associated with op-
portunities for employee voice in the form of dispute resolution systems cor-
respond with greater employee retention and organizational commitment.
The Differential Effects Model
In this article, we suggest a reassessment of the relationship among the im-
portant constructs discussed above. We first note that many DRSs, like the 
one examined in this study, consist of multiple steps beginning with report-
ing to local managers and culminating in final, binding arbitration (Est-
reicher and Eigen 2010). Other research has suggested that it makes sense 
to pay attention to the possible differences in judgments about justice that 
could come from formal versus informal DRS components. For instance, 
Figure 1. Standard Model Connecting DRS Implementation, 
Procedural Justice, and Organizational Commitment
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Tyler and Blader (2000) noted that judgments about justice may be charac-
terized differently for perceptions that come from observing formal rules 
versus observing informal actions by authorities. DRSs often consist of com-
ponents relating to perceptions about how fair the organization is (the 
more formal components of the DRS) and components relating to percep-
tions of how fair local managers are (the less formal components of the 
DRS). It therefore makes sense to account for this bifurcation when concep-
tualizing a model describing the effects of DRS implementation. Building 
on concepts emergent from the literature and grounded in the empirical 
analysis presented herein, we have done just this. Our model suggests that 
the act of implementing a DRS with both informal and formal components 
creates a set of trade- offs. Instead of a unidirectional, universal effect stem-
ming from DRS implementation to increased perceived procedural justice 
to increased organizational commitment, we theorize that DRS implemen-
tation may instead be associated with differential effects that simultaneously 
increase one form of organizational justice (interactional) while diminish-
ing another form of organizational justice (procedural). Local managers 
charged with implementing the DRS and explaining it to their employees 
are incentivized to act in ways that bolster their perceived trustworthiness 
and fairness as an alternative to resorting to the company’s newly imple-
mented formal internal process. Indeed, Colvin’s (2004) qualitative analysis 
of a nonunion dispute resolution system, much like the one under study 
here, revealed behavioral changes along these lines on the part of manag-
ers. After all, local managers do not want to be regarded as failing to handle 
disputes arising at their locations, and claims that they fail to manage end 
up being resolved by the DRS’s centrally administered formal componentry. 
Abundant claim escalation might be perceived as suggesting that local man-
agers are doing something personally wrong. So, local managers likely do 
what they can to increase interactional justice perceptions among their em-
ployees in order to decrease the likelihood of employees resorting to the 
more formal components of the DRS. One result of this structural disincen-
tivization for local managers to champion the formal components of the 
DRS as procedurally fair could be diminished procedural justice as per-
ceived by employees. In other words, because local managers are the gate-
keepers of the DRS, implementation of a DRS could yield increased 
perceived interactional justice at the expense of diminished perceived pro-
cedural justice. Applying existing research and theory, if our differential ef-
fects model of organizational justice holds and DRS implementation is 
associated with an increase in interpersonal justice, there should be a cor-
responding increase in interpersonal commitment. The simultaneous di-
minished perceptions of procedural justice should have no effect (or a net 
negative effect) on organizational commitment.1
1 Our differential effects model is only partially tested by the data described below; we do not have 
the ability to test whether the connection between interpersonal justice and interpersonal commitment 
exists.
 at CORNELL UNIV LIBRARY on September 9, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
178 ILRREVIEW
Perceived Legal Compliance
Aside from this potential differential effect on organizational justice, we 
suggest examining the connection between DRS implementation and per-
ceived legal compliance by the organization. The connection between jus-
tice and legal compliance is well established in other contexts but is relatively 
understudied in the organizational justice literature (Bies and Tyler 1993; 
Tyler 2006). Local managers and employees could regard the company’s 
newly implemented process as being established to protect the company’s 
interests. Because local managers do not want to be perceived as failing to 
dam the tide of disputes that percolate up from their locations (Colvin 
2004), the very act of implementing a DRS at a national organization might 
have the effect of setting the stage for local managers to step to the side of 
their employees in fostering their trust, and creating an “us versus them” 
mentality. The “us” includes managers and employees together. The “them” 
becomes more saliently the amorphous corporate entity implementing the 
formal DRS apparatus. This sets the stage for implementation of the DRS to 
be associated with an increase in the degree to which employees perceive 
that the company is complying with the law.
Perceived legal compliance is an often overlooked but critical compo-
nent of procedural justice (Tyler 1988; Gopinath and Becker 2000). We 
suggest that perceived legal compliance may not positively correlate with 
procedural justice in the context of DRS implementation in a nonunion 
workplace. Employees may regard implementation of a workplace DRS as 
a signal that their employer is more likely in compliance with state and 
federal laws because the employer cares about legal issues and wants to ad-
dress them. If employees regard DRS implementation as providing a fair 
benefit above and beyond the set of legal protections and rights to which 
they feel entitled under the status quo, then perceived legal compliance 
and procedural justice should both increase with DRS implementation. Al-
ternatively, however, employees could fundamentally distrust their em-
ployer. They would regard DRS implementation as a signal that the 
employer is protecting its interests and taking precautions to avoid liabil-
ity. In this case, employees would distinguish between an employer pro-
tecting its interests by complying with minimum laws regulating the 
workplace, and fairness interests above and beyond those minimums. Em-
ployees might then regard the employer as more likely to comply with the 
letter of the law—for instance, avoiding overt discrimination based on 
gender or race. In this case, perceived legal compliance should increase, 
while procedural justice should decrease following DRS implementation. 
This view is plausible in light of findings by Feldman and Tyler (2012) on 
perceived procedural justice when employers are legally mandated to im-
plement fair procedures. The authors hypothesized that employees distin-
guish between “mandates that provide a basic level of security in the 
workplace and additional procedural mechanisms that they view as more 
discretionary.”
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Research on mandatory arbitration of employment disputes lends fur-
ther support for the notion that employees’ perceived legal compliance 
could increase when procedural justice decreases (with DRS implementa-
tion). Researchers generally found positive justice perceptions associated 
with voluntary dispute resolution processes or those in unionized settings 
that were the result of collective bargaining. Whether mandatory arbitra-
tion can similarly enhance perceptions of justice in a nonunion setting 
when an employer unilaterally implements the DRS is an important but 
under- analyzed question (Batt, Colvin, and Keefe 2002). Some suggested it 
creates opportunities for due process (Zack 1999), but others were more 
skeptical of such claims (Stone 1996; Schwartz 2009). Recent research sug-
gested another reason why procedural justice perceptions might decrease 
while perceived legal compliance increases with DRS implementation in a 
nonunion setting. A qualitative study of employees who signed mandatory 
arbitration agreements as a condition of their employment suggested that 
employees may regard these agreements as attempts by the company to in-
sulate itself from legal liability (Eigen 2008). This belief may be due in part 
to the formal, legalistic, and contractual way in which such agreements are 
typically presented. Employees might assume that if corporate headquarters 
insists they sign something that looks like a legal document, the company is 
doing so to protect its legal interests. It is therefore possible that employees 
could interpret a mandatory arbitration component of an employment DRS 
as a legal means of insulating corporate rights in a way that fosters overall 
distrust in the corporate entity because it appears to take away important 
employee legal rights, such as the right to a jury trial, even while simultane-
ously augmenting the degree of perceived legal compliance by the company 
on concerns such as sexual harassment and discrimination. This theory is 
consistent with Feldman and Tyler’s (2012) work described above. In Figure 
2, we present the differential effects model depicting the described interre-
lationship among DRS implementation, organizational justice, and per-
ceived legal compliance.
In spite of repeated calls for empirical research in this area, as other re-
searchers have observed, little is known about how implementation of DRSs 
affects organizational justice and organizational commitment for that vast 
share of employees who never bring complaints through the system (Budd 
and Colvin 2008; Mahony and Klaas 2008). Much has been said about em-
ployee/claimants and their experiences with dispute resolution. Much has 
been written about the difference between claimants and non- claimants. 
But little is known about the impact (if any) of implementation of a work-
place DRS on current employees who know about the DRS’s implementa-
tion but will likely never participate in a claim brought through the DRS. 
Casting this wider net of employees is useful because research has mostly 
focused on claimants and participants, or has compared those smaller 
groups of employees to non- claimants post- implementation of a DRS. We 
believe this is the first attempt to offer an empirical assessment of the im-
pact of implementing a workplace dispute resolution system in a nonunion 
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setting on this wider-cast net of all currently employed workers using pre- 
and post- DRS implementation data on organizational justice, organizational 
commitment, and perceived legal compliance of a group of employees in 
the private sector large enough to render meaningful statistical analysis pos-
sible.
We focus on employees’ perceptions of justice and other survey data re-
porting their opinions—but not behavior such as turnover—for three rea-
sons. First, for employees who have not initiated disputes themselves, one 
would not expect a significant effect of implementation of a DRS on exiting 
behavior. The relatively low- skilled nature of the work of frontline employ-
ees’ at Gilda’s disadvantages these employees in the outside labor market, 
suggesting that, in this context, exit rates would be a flawed measure of the 
impact of the DRS (Edwards and Scullion 1982). Second, behavioral mea-
sures like firm exit are more likely explained by factors other than DRS im-
plementation, such as how badly employees need the job or whether their 
expectations for the job are short- or long- term. Third, employees cannot 
exit the firm anonymously, but they can (and do, in the data we analyzed) 
report their honest views about the critical constructs like organizational 
justice, organizational commitment, and perceived legal compliance. Be-
cause these constructs are critically linked to other important measures de-
scribed above, the survey data we use are uniquely suited to the present 
analysis. In some respects, they offer more salient information than behav-
ior. Observing an employee exiting the firm tells us nothing about the 
Figure 2. Differential Effects Model Connecting DRS Implementation, Organizational 
Justice, Legal Compliance, and Organizational Commitment
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employee’s motivations for leaving, without which we have no information 
about the relationship between the DRS and any implementable HR inter-
ventions.
The Employer’s DRS
We analyze eight years of data from a single company that operates in the 
United States, “Gilda’s, Inc.”2 It employs more than 100,000 workers in more 
than 1,000 locations. The company implemented a four- step DRS for all of 
its employees in all of its locations that went into effect on January 1, 2004. 
Our understanding from reviewing records and talking with individuals in 
Gilda’s corporate Human Resources (HR) department is that the rollout of 
this DRS did not occur at the same time as anything else that might be ex-
pected to shock employees’ perceptions of their managers or the company, 
nor was the introduction of the DRS part of a larger, company- wide initia-
tive to revamp other aspects of work. Prior to the introduction of the DRS, 
employees were encouraged to report claims of illegal treatment in viola-
tion of federal and state law to their managers or to Gilda’s corporate HR 
department, which maintained a toll- free, call- in number for employees 
who wished to make claims anonymously.
Like many workplace DRSs, the program at Gilda’s starts informally with 
claim initiation with local supervisors, escalates to formal review by 
corporate- level HR, and culminates in final, binding, mandatory arbitra-
tion. More specifically, the four steps of Gilda’s DRS are as follows:
1)  An employee may initiate a claim and attempt to resolve it with his local 
manager;
2)  If unresolved to his satisfaction at the local level, an employee may then 
report his claim to corporate HR, and someone will attempt to resolve 
the claim;
3) If unresolved to his satisfaction by HR, a claimant may then escalate his 
claim and choose between a determination made by a peer- review panel 
consisting of three fellow employees, or, by a unilateral determination 
made by another HR department member; and
4) If still unresolved to the employee’s satisfaction, he or she may initiate a 
claim to be brought before final, binding arbitration.
All newly hired employees complete typical employment forms and sign a 
contract binding them to resolve any and all legal claims in arbitration. The 
orientation process is run by local managers based on talking points pro-
vided to them by Gilda’s corporate HR department. New employees watch a 
2 “Gilda’s” is the pseudonym chosen to protect the company’s anonymity. The authors are bound by a 
confidentiality agreement with Gilda’s that restricts our ability to offer more background information 
about the organizational and workplace context surrounding the DRS implementation.
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short video that plainly describes the four- step DRS. Local managers are re-
sponsible for explaining the DRS to their employees.
Gilda’s four- step DRS is typical of private sector employment DRSs in two 
key ways. First, it covers employee claims ranging from generic unfair treat-
ment or complaints about random nonlegal matters to highly legalized 
claims such as discrimination or harassment under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Second, Gilda’s DRS contains two distinct components: 
an informal, localized piece (step 1), followed by a formal, adjudicatory one 
(steps 2–4).
Data and Methods
Survey Instrument and Variable Construction
At its peak over the 2000–2007 sample period, Gilda’s employed more than 
100,000 workers in more than 1,000 locations. Each April, about one- third 
of these locations were chosen at random to participate in an annual, paper- 
and- pencil survey on employment relations and HR matters. Occasionally, a 
few stores might be added to the annual sample if senior management had 
a particular interest in a given store. The most likely reason this would occur 
is because the otherwise random selection of stores had perennially omitted 
a location. Since the survey was administered during regular working hours, 
it achieved an impressive 80% response rate even in the absence of any fi-
nancial incentive for completion other than paid time away from one’s 
usual employment responsibilities.
While the sheer quantity of data shared by Gilda’s is massive—more than 
300,000 worker survey responses spread across eight survey years—the data 
were not originally collected for research purposes. This engenders two 
types of challenges—creating a cleanly and confidently linked panel data 
set of store- years and constructing appropriate employment relations and 
HR indices. First, it was not always perfectly obvious when observations from 
a given store could be reliably linked to that store’s observations in other 
years. Though Gilda’s uses a numbering system for its stores, there were 
times when identical store numbers were associated with slightly different 
store descriptions or when identical store descriptions appeared to be asso-
ciated with multiple store numbers. We resolved as many of these anomalies 
as possible with help from Gilda’s management and from reliable external 
sources. When we were not able to confidently reconcile survey responses, 
we dropped them from the analysis. Furthermore, while the original sam-
pling frame included mid- level managers, part- time employees, and workers 
in supporting roles, we excluded them to ensure that all workers surveyed 
were frontline workers, doing essentially the same work. In the net, this 
yielded 215,140 frontline worker responses from 635 different stores over 
the eight- year period.
The second challenge this company- collected data makes for research is 
the roster of actual survey items and the indices that we worked to create 
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from them. The items themselves were neither developed from pre- validated 
scales nor kept completely identical across survey instruments. While it is 
safe to assume that all employees surveyed in a given year in a given store 
responded to the same instrument, the survey instruments did vary slightly 
from year to year and even between regions in a given year. In general, each 
instrument included between 20 and 40 items, all of which were answered 
on a 5- point Likert- type scale in which 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = 
“strongly agree.”3 We addressed this inconsistency issue first by identifying 
each of the distinct survey questions asked over all of the survey instruments, 
allowing even small changes in wording to constitute a distinction. This ex-
ercise yielded about 90 “unique” survey items. The researchers then worked 
independently to group the items by “theme,” for example, questions re-
garding perceptions of procedural justice, or questions regarding the qual-
ity and frequency of managerial communication. This yielded surprisingly 
similar and thus (inter- rater) reliable groupings (Schwab 2005).
Ideally, we could then verify high inter- item reliability by computing 
something along the lines of a Cronbach’s D, where a large D could justify 
our coalescing the items into a named index. None of the groupings, how-
ever, yielded any observations that contained values for every single one of 
its constituent items, thereby preventing our use of the standard estimate of 
reliability, or of similar data reduction techniques such as factor analysis.4 
Consequently, we created scales by taking “row means”—averaging scores 
across the items constituting a given index or scale, for however many non- 
missing items are available, for a given observation.5 The end result is a set 
of four employment relations measures that emerge directly from the data, 
the very same data that the company itself relied on to make and assess its 
HR strategy. Moreover, the four emergent variables span a range of mea-
sures that combine to paint a rich picture of the broad employment rela-
tions and HR climate pre- and post- DRS.
The definitions of these variables as well as the construction of each index 
are detailed in Table 1. Procedural justice relies on eight items to assess em-
ployees’ perceptions that they 1) have access to formal mechanisms for ap-
pealing adverse employment actions, and 2) are afforded the opportunity 
to speak up in their dealings with the company and its agents. This assess-
ment comports with the way others have defined and measured procedural 
justice (Naumann and Bennett 2000; Colquitt, Noe, and Jackson 2002; 
Aquino, Tripp, and Bies 2006). It is also harmonious with the more informal 
manifestations of voice that are of increasing interest to organizational 
3 The surveys also posed two or three open- ended text questions, but we were not provided the employ-
ees’ responses to these questions.
4 Factor analysis, for example, relies on list- wise deletion, which in this case, yields an empty data set.
5 That is, the summative score is divided by the number of items for which the sum was calculated. For 
example, if only five of eight items had non- missing values, then the five items would be summed and 
divided by five. This approach is consistent with the way index values are imputed from the usual con-
struction of a summative index using Cronbach’s D if one or more items underlying the index are miss-
ing for a particular observation.
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Construction
Variable Definition in italics, with actual survey questions underneath
Dispute Resolution System (DRS) Is the DRS in place? (binary variable in which 0 = “no” and 1 = “yes”)
Procedural Justice Employees have access to formal mechanisms for appealing adverse employ-
ment actions and are afforded voice in their dealings with the company 
and its agents.
If I have a problem, there is someone in senior management I can 
go to who will assist me.
This location has an effective means of appealing discipline and 
discharge actions.
If I can’t get a problem resolved in my store, HR continues to be 
accessible to me and provides guidance.
I believe that this company is committed to resolving associate 
concerns or problems quickly and in a fair manner.
My direct supervisor is interested in my opinion on work- related 
issues.
My general manager listens to employees’ concerns, issues, and 
suggestions.
My manager is interested in my opinion on work- related issues.
If I have a problem, there is a manager in my location I can go to 
for help.
Interactional Justice Local store managers and supervisors treat employees with respect and sen-
sitivity.
My manager regularly shows me that he/she cares about me.
My direct supervisor treats me with courtesy and respect.
My direct supervisor regularly shows me that he/she cares about 
me.
Once my schedule is posted, my manager only makes changes that 
I agree to.
Legal Compliance The workplace is in compliance with the law, particularly laws against ha-
rassment and discrimination.
I feel my work environment is free from harassment and discrimi-
nation.
My supervisor manages everyone in my group equally regardless 
of their race, age, or sex.
My direct supervisor manages everyone in my group equally re-
gardless of their race, age, or sex.
I think the company is doing a great job of providing a workplace 
free from intimidation, threats, and other behaviors that could 
impact my safety.
Racial, ethnic, and gender- based comments/jokes are not toler-
ated at this location.
I feel I am treated fairly and with respect regardless of my race, 
gender, or age.
I feel my work environment is free from discrimination based 
upon gender, race, age, or sex(ual orientation).
Organizational Commitment Employees feel committed to the organization.
Work like mine greatly encourages me to do my best.
The supervision I receive is the kind that greatly encourages me to 
give extra effort.
I expect to be working here one year from now.
My job is considered important in this company.
I believe in what we are doing in this store.
I feel positive about the opportunity here to advance my career.
Note: With the exception of the DRS dummy, all variables are continuous and measured on a Likert- type 
scale such that 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly agree.”
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justice researchers (Detert and Trevino 2010; Klaas, Olson- Buchanan, and 
Ward 2012) and that interviews revealed were at play in the workplaces 
under study. So, procedural justice measures employee comfort initiating 
claims as well as the perception that the entity (e.g., Gilda’s as a whole, the 
HR department), the person (e.g., a local supervisor or manager), or the 
process addressing the claim, be it informal (i.e., step 1) or formal (i.e., 
steps 2–4) (Tyler and Blader 2000), does so in a neutral, effective, and fair 
manner. Therefore, the survey questions also align with descriptions of ac-
cess and problem- solving viability described in several studies outlining crit-
ical elements by which to gauge the effectiveness with which disputes are 
addressed in a workplace with or without a DRS in place (Folger and Bies 
1989; Tyler and Bies 1990; Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton 1992).
Recall that interactional justice is distinct from procedural justice in that 
the former explicitly excludes voice, even one’s expression of her opinion 
to her immediate supervisor. Rather, interactional justice captures the ex-
tent to which store managers and supervisors treat employees with respect 
and sensitivity. So, the construct reflects the degree to which workers feel 
well- treated, not by “the company” per se, but by managers and direct super-
visors with whom they deal on a personal level. In other words, in the course 
of everyday managerial decision- making, are one’s needs being taken into 
account (Bies and Moag 1986; Aquino, Lewis, and Bradfield 1999; Bies 
2001)? We construct the measure of interactional justice from four survey 
items that align closely with validated scales used by Moorman (1991) and 
Niehoff and Moorman (1993).
Legal compliance tracks employees’ perceptions not of how they are 
treated, but rather the degree to which the firm is regarded as following the 
law, particularly with respect to laws prohibiting discrimination and harass-
ment. Such compliance is an often overlooked but critical component of 
workplace governance (Balser 2000; Wallace et al. 2008). This tracking al-
lows for a nuanced examination of DRS effectiveness, whereby workers may 
believe the law is being better followed post- DRS, whether their personal 
treatment has improved or not. Finally, to vet the traditional model linking 
DRS implementation with loyalty to the firm, we measure organizational 
commitment as well. The literature frequently relies on turnover as a mea-
sure of organizational commitment (Spencer 1986; Byrne 2005). As ex-
plained above with respect to other behavioral measures, however, both 
practicality and the study context dictated that we rely on perceptual mea-
sures of organizational commitment. Indeed, the six survey questions mak-
ing up this construct align well with commonly used validated scales 
(Mowday, Steers, and Porter 1979; Cook and Wall 1980).
While the indices were constructed using worker- level data, the multivari-
ate analysis relies on a store- level data set, created by taking means of each 
of the resulting indices by store- year. Since stores can be linked from year- to- 
year but individuals cannot, the decision to use store- years as the unit- of- 
analysis allows us to take advantage of powerful techniques for analyzing 
cross- sectional times series (panel) data. Given the conservative pruning of 
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the data described above, the resulting data set includes 1,171 store- years 
representing 635 distinct stores. Table 2 shows the number of stores contrib-
uting observations for each of the dependent variables, by year. The employ-
ment relations and HR measures serve as dependent variables in the sense 
that their movement over time should reflect the impact of Gilda’s DRS. 
The latter is the focal independent variable and is operationalized as a bi-
nary variable equal to one for years 2004 onward.
In the aggregate, while cognizant of the challenges as well as the opportu-
nities presented to us by these data, we believe that the judgments made in 
assembling the panel as well as those made in constructing the employment 
relations and HR measures work to attenuate rather than to bias our esti-
mates, engendering a collectively conservative assessment of the impact of 
Gilda’s DRS.
Empirical Strategy
Gilda’s DRS went into effect for all employees at all locations right in the 
middle of the observation period—January 1, 2004. Therefore, the data 
allow us to track movements in employment relations variables over time, 
including the impact of a policy- induced discontinuity beginning with the 
2004 observations. While we cannot rule out alternative explanations for 
the effects of implementing the DRS caused by contemporaneous exoge-
nous shocks, we have no reason to suspect that this is occurring. As noted 
above, our use of store- level data to analyze the effects of implementing the 
DRS avails us of fixed- effects (FE) models to account for time- constant un-
observables at the store level. We detail these methods below.
As a first pass, we will simply compare the mean values for our four de-
pendent variables before and after the implementation of the DRS. To claim 
that any discontinuity is associated with the implementation of Gilda’s DRS, 
however, we would need to control for store- level variables that could ex-
plain the otherwise relatively “smooth” variation over time in employment 
relations outcomes. While we have little information on each store other 
than its yearly “bag” of survey responses, we can generally match each store’s 
responses in a given year to its responses in all other years. Consequently, we 
can control for all store- level, time- constant, unobservable sources of varia-
tion in employment relations measures. We can do this first by simply aug-
menting the differences- in- means tests to account for store- level fixed 
effects. These tests, while easy to interpret, still allow for the possibility that 
time- varying unobservable variables are biasing the estimated impact of the 
DRS on the dependent variables. Therefore, we will also offer a more so-
phisticated model that at least partially accounts for these time- varying un-
observable drivers of employment relations outcomes.
The most transparent and conservative way to do this is to consider same- 
store values of each dependent variable pre- and post- DRS, net of as many 
confounding effects as possible. The longitudinal nature of the data facili-
tates this effort first by allowing us to estimate FE models to account for 
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time- constant unobservable drivers of employment relations at the store- 
level (Baltagi 2005). From a practical perspective, this requires a model that 
includes a vector of 635 store- specific dummies on the right- hand side. Sec-
ond, reliance on panel data also facilitates a way of dealing with time- varying 
unobserved variables that could be positively correlated with both the im-
plementation of the DRS and of the dependent variables, factors that could 
bias the critical estimates of the slope coefficient associated with the DRS. It 
is important to note that since the DRS was instituted centrally and simulta-
neously across all stores and by Gilda’s senior management at corporate 
headquarters, many of these unobserved variables would likely be company- 
or even economy- wide, not store- specific. Therefore, we can strip the esti-
mates of some of these time- varying unobservables by including an 
additional vector of binary variables—one for each year—on the right side 
of the equation. Formally, we model employment relations and HR vari-
ables using a multilevel model,
(1) y d d xit k
k
k T
T
T it it it= + + +
= =
∑ ∑
1
635
2001
2007
α α β ε ,
where y represents any one of the four employment relations variables for 
store i in year t and Hit is a zero- expectation error term. The first term on the 
right side represents a dummy variable for each store, dk, multiplied by a 
store- specific intercept, Dk. Since there is no shared intercept term (akin to D0), this entire first term can be simplified to Di, a single intercept term for 
store i. Similarly, the second term adds a dummy, dT, for each year other 
than the first year, 2000, multiplied by a year- specific intercept, DT. This cap-
tures the year- specific mean of the dependent variable, and can thus be sim-
plified to Dt. Consequently, Equation 1 can instead be written as
(2) yit = Di + Dt + Eitxit + Hit,
where the key explanatory variable—the binary representing the implemen-
tation and ongoing use of the DRS—is represented by xit. Therefore, the 
focal coefficient estimate is Eˆit, which measures the impact of the DRS on 
the dependent variable, net of unobserved sources of store- specific and 
year- specific variation. To further err in a conservative direction, we com-
pute standard errors using the generalized Huber- White formula clustered 
by store, allowing for arbitrary correlations of residuals among store- year 
observations (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).6
Results
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the focal indepen-
dent variable as well as for the four employment relations measures. Note 
6 In almost all cases and as expected, the standard errors calculated by the Huber- White formula are 
only minutely greater than the standard errors that otherwise emerge from this model, because the 
model already accounts for the dependence structure of the data.
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that about 56% of the observations are post- DRS. Interestingly, both proce-
dural justice and organizational commitment reveal a negative, zero- order 
association with the DRS, while interactional justice and legal compliance 
are positively, pair- wise correlated with the DRS. Delving more deeply into 
the employment relations variables, recall that each is measured on a 5- 
point, Likert- type scale in which 1 = “strongly disagree” and 5 = “strongly 
agree.” Therefore, since the means for these variables are all in the range 
from 3.49 to 3.88, all are somewhere between the neutral response (“nei-
ther agree nor disagree”) and agreement.
The most straightforward demonstration of a difference in the values of 
the dependent variables between the pre- DRS and post- DRS periods would 
be with a simple difference- in- means accompanied by a t- test of that differ-
ence. Unfortunately, this test is precluded by the fact that the same stores 
appear repeatedly, from one to six times over the 2000–2007 observation 
period, violating the independence assumption that underpins a standard 
t- test. We therefore calculate the pre- and post- DRS means and the differ-
ences between them by backing them out from a random effects regression 
model that accounts for the dependence between stores. The results can be 
interpreted as one would normally interpret a difference- in- means. The t- 
statistic, however, is replaced by a z- statistic owing to the fact that the null 
hypothesis for a variance components model assumes a normal sampling 
distribution rather than a t- distribution.7
Table 4 presents these simple differences- in- differences for each of the 
dependent variables. First focusing on procedural justice, note that its mean 
value across all stores in the pre- DRS period was 3.59 on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 5, where 1 is low and 5 is high. In the post- DRS period, the mean 
score for procedural justice is 3.37. This represents a 0.21 decrease in this 
dependent variable. It accounts for the nonindependence of observations 
by stores, making the test- of- significance more conservative. Even so, the 
0.21 reduction in procedural justice is highly statistically significant (p < 
.001). The results for the other three dependent variables can be inter-
preted similarly. On the one hand, post- DRS observations reveal measurably 
7 Because the finite sample distribution for a variance components model does not have a simple form, 
most researchers and most statistics packages rely on the asymptotic (i.e., large- sample) sampling distri-
bution (Skrondal and Rabe- Hesketh 2004).
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study Sample
# Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Dispute Resolution System  .56 .50 1.00
2 Procedural Justice 3.49 .34 –.23 1.00
3 Interactional Justice 3.88 .32 .37 .27 1.00
4 Legal Compliance 3.80 .32 .24 .51 .60 1.00
5 Organizational Commitment 3.63 .25 –.14 .73 .49 .43 1.00
Note: Sample sizes differ by cell, but range from n = 1,028 to n = 1,171 store- years.
Key: All correlation coefficients are significant at p < .0001.
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greater values than their pre- DRS counterparts, all at very high levels of sta-
tistical significance, for interactional justice and legislative compliance. On 
the other hand, mean scores for organizational commitment fall very 
slightly, by 0.06, also statistically significant at the p < .001 level.
The results reported in Table 4 can be made slightly more robust by treat-
ing the separate stores in the data not as a “nuisance” factor to be accounted 
for but as an explicit source of variation in the dependent variables. Along 
these lines, Table 5 presents differences- in- means that parallel the results in 
Table 4. In this case, the means are backed out of a fixed- effects estimate 
that includes a vector of binary variables, one for each of the separate stores 
in the data. These dummy variables “soak up” any part of the variation in 
the dependent variable that can be accounted for by time- constant, unob-
served attributes of each individual store.
The results in Table 5 may be interpreted almost identically to those in 
Table 4, the only difference being that these results can be thought of as 
“within- store” effects. Looking at procedural justice once again as an illus-
tration, on average, within a given store, perceptions of procedural justice 
fell by 0.22 between the pre- DRS and post- DRS periods. This difference is 
about the same as the difference- in- means when unobserved differences 
Table 4. Mean Values for Dependent Variables 
before and after the Implementation of a Dispute Resolution System, 
Not Accounting for Unobserved Differences across Stores
Dependent Variable Pre- DRS Post- DRS Difference z- statistic
Procedural Justice 3.59 3.37 –.21 –12.22***
Interactional Justice 3.67 3.98 –.31 –19.37***
Legislative Compliance 3.64 3.84 –.20 –12.60***
Organizational Commitment 3.65 3.59 –.06 –4.81***
Notes: Table reports pre- DRS and post- DRS means calculated as the linear combination of the 
constant and the coefficient on a DRS dummy for random- effects regression estimates of 
each of the dependent variables.  Statistical significance accounts for the clustering of obser-
vations by store.
Key: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Table 5. Mean Values for Dependent Variables 
before and after the Implementation of a Dispute Resolution System, 
Accounting for Unobserved Differences across Stores
Dependent Variable Pre- DRS Post- DRS Difference t- statistic
Procedural Justice 3.59 3.37 –.22 –10.69***
Interactional Justice 3.66 3.98 .32 –17.15***
Legislative Compliance 3.66 3.83 .17 –10.79***
Organizational Commitment 3.63 3.61 –.03  –2.20*
Notes: Table reports pre- DRS and post- DRS means calculated as the linear combination of the 
constant and the coefficient on a DRS dummy for fixed- effects regression estimates of each 
of the dependent variables.  Statistical significance accounts for the clustering of observa-
tions by store.
Key: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
 at CORNELL UNIV LIBRARY on September 9, 2015ilr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
JUSTICE OR JUST BETWEEN US? 191
between stores are not accounted for (0.21). In this case, the differences are 
tested with the usual t- statistic, since the fixed- effects model yields a finite 
sample distribution with a shape than can be easily determined based on 
the degrees of freedom. Overall, the results are qualitatively identical to 
those in Table 4, implying that pre- post differences in the mean values of 
the dependent variables cannot be attributed to unobserved factors at the 
store level. The one partial exception, however, is organizational commit-
ment. While the before- and- after difference remains statistically significant, 
it loses precision in Table 5 relative to Table 4, suggesting that some unob-
served characteristic at the store- level is at least partially responsible for the 
apparent correlation between organizational commitment and the DRS. 
Nonetheless, relative to the pre- DRS period, within the same stores, percep-
tions of procedural justice and measures of organizational commitment de-
creased while perceptions of interactional justice and legislative compliance 
both increased.
What the results in Tables 4 and 5 do not account for are time- varying 
firm- and economy- wide unobservables that could also be correlated with 
both the DRS dummy and the dependent variables. The omission of these 
variables could allow for effects to be wrongly attributed to the DRS. There-
fore, the regression estimates in Table 6 allow for a more nuanced analysis 
of the employment relations variables, one that teases out the impact of the 
DRS not only from the other store- level drivers of the dependent variables, 
as in Table 5, but also from year- specific forces that impinge on the depen-
dent variables. Each model estimates Equation 2 independently for each of 
the enumerated employment relations variables. Stepping through Model 1 
to illustrate, notice that even after controlling for store- fixed and year- fixed 
effects, the introduction of the DRS is associated with a 0.30- point decrease 
in the 5- point measure of procedural justice. Not only is this slightly larger 
than the effect estimated in the absence of year dummies, the estimate 
Table 6. Fixed- Effects Estimates of the Impact of a Dispute Resolution System 
on Employment Relations Outcomes
Independent Variable
Model 1:
Procedural 
Justice
Model 2:
Interactional 
Justice
Model 3:
Legal 
Compliance
Model 4:
Organizational 
Commitment
Dispute Resolution System –.30*** (–6.13) .33*** (9.11) .36*** (9.60) .001 (0.03)
nstore years 942 1,049 1,032 1,053
ndistinct stores 492 1,527 1, 527 1, 528U .59 .54 .63 .54
R2 .37 .51 .25 .03
Notes: Table reports coefficient estimates and associated t- statistics from longitudinal regression 
models on panel data, with standard errors clustered by store location. All models include dummy 
variables for each survey year and for each store. Therefore, models estimate fixed- year and fixed- 
store effects, where U is a measure of intraclass correlation. The R2 reported is the “within- ” R2, 
meaning that it does not reflect the explanatory power arising from the large vector of store dum-
mies or from “between- store” differences in the independent variables.
Key: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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achieves the same level of statistical significance (p < .001). The model ex-
plains 37% of the within- store variance in procedural justice across the 492 
stores that were able to provide data for this index, and thus, that were in-
cluded in the estimate. Each store lent, on average, 1.9 observations (942 y
) to the estimate of Model 1. Finally, U is the share of the estimated vari-
ance of the overall error, Hit, accounted for by effects at the store level, a 
measure of intraclass correlation. In this case, 59% of the variability in pro-
cedural justice can be attributed to differences between (versus within) 
stores. This value for U bolsters our analysis in two ways. First, it substantiates 
our decision not to estimate conventional OLS models, since OLS requires 
that U = 0 (Singer and Willett 2003). Second, it justifies our decision to 
model the dependent variable at the store- level as opposed to the person- 
level as individual survey responses in a given year do, indeed, cluster within 
a given store. The remaining three models can be interpreted similarly. The 
implementation of the DRS is associated with increased perceptions of in-
teractional justice and of legal compliance. Interestingly, in the case of legis-
lative compliance, the estimated effect of the DRS, accounting for firm- and 
economy- wide unobservables by year, are actually larger than they were for 
estimates that do not include year dummies (shown in Table 5). Finally, 
Model 4 attempts to predict organizational commitment using the exact 
same model and right- hand-side variables as the other three models. Note 
that the same variables that shed light on justice and legal compliance do 
very little to illuminate the drivers of organizational commitment. More-
over, by comparing the Model 4 estimates to the differences- in- means in 
Tables 4 and 5, we can see that no simple relationship is observed between 
the DRS and organizational commitment as occurs between the DRS and 
the other three dependent variables.
Nonetheless, in the net, the regression results support the theory that the 
DRS affected the workforce in a bifurcated manner, decaying at perceptions 
of procedural justice while boosting perceived levels of interactional justice. 
The DRS, on average, was also associated with increased perceptions on the 
part of frontline employees that Gilda’s was, indeed, complying with the law. 
Once store- level and year- level effects are controlled for though, no evi-
dence supports a simple, DRS- induced change in organizational commit-
ment.
Discussion
By offering evidence of the effects of implementing a typical workplace DRS 
with both formal and informal components, we present a case that calls into 
question the extant model connecting DRS implementation, procedural 
justice, and organizational commitment. Implementation of Gilda’s DRS is 
associated with improved perceived interactional justice, improved per-
ceived legal compliance, and reduced perceived procedural justice, but has 
no identifiable effect on organizational commitment. Limitations of this 
natural experiment notwithstanding, the evidence in this article suggests 
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that implementation of Gilda’s DRS improved frontline employees’ percep-
tions of interactional justice. Perhaps the trade- off for this benefit of imple-
menting a DRS such as Gilda’s is a decrease in procedural justice found in 
this study. These findings lend support for parts of the model depicted in 
Figure 3.
Our findings might reflect the way in which local managers explain Gil-
da’s DRS to employees, and the fact that local supervisors are perceived by 
Gilda’s corporate HR department as being better at their jobs if fewer em-
ployee claims are escalated, consistent with received case study research of 
nonunion systems implemented elsewhere (Colvin 2004). They are encour-
aged and rewarded for resolving claims at the local level. Immediate super-
visors might be incentivized to encourage their employees to trust them to 
resolve claims instead of allowing HR or Gilda’s as a corporate entity to do 
so. Perhaps local managers actively encourage employees to trust them, 
which could be interpreted implicitly as being encouraged to distrust Gil-
da’s DRS or the company writ large.
Implementation of the DRS is most strongly associated with an increase 
in employees’ perceptions that the company is in compliance with the law. 
This observation might seem counterintuitive at first given the lack of effect 
on organizational commitment and the decrease in perceived formal proce-
dural justice, which could be interpreted as a lack of trust in Gilda’s to fairly 
Figure 3. Observed Means of Dependent Variables by Year (Individual Level Data)
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resolve disputes internally. The observed concurrent increase in Gilda’s em-
ployees’ perceived legal compliance and decrease in perceived procedural 
justice is consistent with recent research (Eigen 2008; Feldman and Tyler 
2012). One possible explanation for why employees regard the company as 
more compliant with the law and simultaneously less fair in resolving dis-
putes is that being made to sign a form- contract requiring acquiescence to 
final, binding, mandatory arbitration makes the company’s intent to be “le-
gally compliant” more salient to them. This way of thinking is likely to be 
the case here since the form explicitly mentions coverage of employment 
discrimination and harassment and other statutory claims. Employees may 
regard the formal processes associated with the DRS and Gilda’s require-
ment that they contract away their right to a jury trial as a signal that the 
company takes its legal rights and obligations more seriously on a going- 
forward basis. This explanation derives from employees’ perceptions of the 
formal aspect of the DRS and is consistent with the approach suggested by 
Tyler and Blader (2000). Future research should continue to explore how 
bifurcated systems consisting of both formal processes invoking legal rights 
adjudication, such as mandatory arbitration, and informal procedures, such 
as reporting complaints to local managers, invoke differentiated organiza-
tional justice findings such as those described in this study.
Alternatively, employees might believe the company complies with the 
law because of the heightened trust and comfort with local management. 
Employees might feel that they are treated fairly by local supervisors and 
that their concerns are genuinely heard by local management. In turn, em-
ployees may be more likely to perceive local management as being compli-
ant with laws that prohibit discrimination based on gender, race, or age. 
This explanation accords with research that suggests that employees over- 
broadly characterize “unfair” behavior as “illegal” (Bies and Tyler 1993). It 
also implies the converse: that they over- broadly characterize “fair” behavior 
as “legal.” It is hard to tell if the augmented legal compliance perceptions 
are related to the positive effects of interactional justice or the negative ef-
fects of procedural justice. Further research should explore which accounts 
for the observed effects.
The Gilda’s case offers rare insight into employees’ perceptions of impor-
tant workplace metrics before and after the implementation of a workplace 
DRS. The findings suggest that more attention should be paid to the bi-
furcated components of dispute resolution systems. Specifically, it may 
make sense for researchers to more carefully discern informal from formal 
 processes because the latter are more closely associated with the corporate 
 entity and the former with individual local managers responsible for admin-
istering DRSs and handling disputes at their earliest stages. Our findings 
also lend indirect support for complementarity models of dispute resolu-
tion like that offered by Bendersky (2003), which suggest that varying the 
degree of input into the process and the flavor of the dispute resolution 
system at- hand differentially impacts the non- disputant population. Finally, 
this study indicates the need to focus research efforts on understanding 
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differential effects of organizational change on perceptions of local versus 
nonlocal management, particularly as related to the standard exit- voice- 
loyalty model. As other studies have shown, employees may differ in the de-
gree to which they feel committed to organizations locally versus globally 
(Gregersen and Black 1992) and organizationally versus personally (with re-
spect to their immediate supervisors) (Becker, Billings, Eveleth, and Gilbert 
1996). As illustrated by the full version of the differential- effects model 
shown in Figure 3, it could be that a trade- off occurs between formal and 
informal procedural justice similar to the observed trade- off between inter-
actional and pro cedural justice that results in less organizational commit-
ment but greater interpersonal commitment (to immediate supervisors and 
managers), concurrently with increased perceived legal compliance by the 
organization.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations. Like most case studies that exploit 
data from a single organization, one can reasonably question the generaliz-
ability of the findings. As noted earlier, however, the four- step process insti-
tuted at Gilda’s—where disputes are first dealt with informally, and then 
with increasing formality, until the final step, binding arbitration—very 
closely resembles the archetypal DRS found in nonunion firms (Colvin 
2011; Eigen, Menillo, and Sherwyn 2012). Indeed, this is part of what made 
Gilda’s such an attractive site for undertaking the first analysis of this type, 
in which a wide range of workforce and work- related variables could be held 
in place. To the extent that legitimate challenges to the generalizability of 
our findings persist, we believe that the internal validity allowed for by the 
organizationally bounded nature of our data is a worthwhile dividend, par-
ticularly given the dearth of pre- and post- analyses of the impact of a DRS.
Closely related to the issue of generalizability—or external validity—is 
the notion of construct validity. As mentioned above, the data relied on in 
this study were not originally collected for research purposes, and there-
fore, do not reflect the level of care and meticulousness that researchers 
take when crafting survey instruments and constructing variables for analy-
sis. Most important, Gilda’s and its survey vendor made limited appeal to 
pre- validated scales. They also allowed for slight changes year- to- year and 
between regions in both the precise phrasing of and the composition of 
survey items, challenges that we addressed as conservatively and transpar-
ently as possible. Notwithstanding these issues, we defend the use of these 
data in two ways. First, the questions asked on the annual survey likely re-
flected issues with which Gilda’s management were most concerned. The 
information provided in the survey responses—the exact same data that we 
rely on in our analysis—underpinned the firm’s justification for creating a 
structured approach to dispute resolution in the first place and fed the 
firm’s dashboard for assessing the effectiveness of the DRS. Second, while 
items from validated scales would have been preferred, some have argued 
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that such survey items—typically developed in a context different from the 
one in which they are ultimately employed—often create “frame- of- reference” 
problems (Hunter and Pil 1995). As in previous studies that make use of 
study- specific survey items (e.g., Bidwell 2009; Litwin 2011), we can at least 
be more assured that survey respondents understood the questions they 
were being asked and the situational context to which the questions were 
referring.
A separate issue that comes into play is that of nonrandom sample attri-
tion. Specifically, given the design of the data set and what theory tells us 
about DRSs, it is possible that some workers reacted to the new system “with 
their feet.” That is, they exited the work situation rather than staying in the 
organization and revealing changes in their perceptions of justice. To the 
extent that those most likely to sense injustice or those least committed to 
the organization were more likely to leave the organization, their absence in 
the post- DRS period could bias the estimated effects of the DRS. Note that 
we do not try to decompose the DRS’s ability to “change minds” from its in-
strumentality over the composition of the workforce. Rather, we demon-
strate changes in within- store workforce means in the dependent variables 
over the sample period. Nonetheless, one can re- run all of the analyses in 
the article on the subset of respondents in the post- DRS period that were 
reportedly working for Gilda’s in the pre- DRS period.8 Indeed, when we do, 
all of the estimates run on this limited data set are qualitatively identical to 
the ones run on the full data set and presented above.
Finally, while our models are careful to control for time- constant, unob-
served factors at the store level, the nature of the “treatment”—putting the 
DRS into effect—does not allow for an econometric means by which to fully 
control for time- varying drivers at the store level. This control would be fea-
sible only if the DRS itself went into effect at varying times in different stores, 
allowing us to partial out the impact of unobserved variables, be they spatial 
or temporal, using an event study- type framework (McWilliams and Siegel 
1997). Therefore, we must rely on our own observation as well as consistent 
reports from Gilda’s HR professionals and managers that there were no sys-
tematic changes in the work environment within stores over the observation 
period. Indeed, as noted above, the richness of this qualitative information 
is what made the research setting so appealing despite the aforementioned 
challenges that it creates for generalizability.
Conclusion
This study exploited unique, longitudinal data from a single company, al-
lowing us to evaluate employee perceptions of organizational justice and 
beliefs about whether and to what extent the firm implementing the DRS is 
complying with the law, both before and after its implementation. Findings 
from the case suggest that implementing a DRS has the theorized differential 
8 The survey asks employees to self- report how many years they have been Gilda’s employees.
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effects on organizational justice. In the data analyzed, the effects of DRS 
implementation are decreased procedural justice and increased interac-
tional justice and increased perceived legal compliance. Implementation of 
Gilda’s DRS has no statistically significant effect on organizational commit-
ment. These findings raise important questions about the degree to which 
commitment to remain employed at a firm is associated with unilaterally 
imposed DRSs in a nonunion environment, implying that perhaps part of 
the fundamental trade- off of formal voice procedures like mandatory arbi-
tration is increased perceived legal compliance for reduced perceived pro-
cedural justice, with no net effect on organizational commitment. Perhaps 
the corresponding increase in interactional justice associated with the DRS’s 
implementation is linked to employee commitment, but commitment to 
local supervisors—what could be described as interpersonal commitment—
instead of to the organization.
To explain these findings, we offer the differential effects model linking 
employment dispute resolution with organizational justice, organizational 
commitment, interpersonal commitment, and perceived legal compliance 
as a means of sparking conversations about the relationship among these 
important constructs. We hope to cast some doubt on the unidirectional, 
standard model of DRS implementation. As noted above, we do not set out 
to fully test the differential effects model we propose. It is offered to aug-
ment our understanding of the relationship among these constructs built 
on decades of research and to push future research in more productive di-
rections. In addition to advancing theory, dispute system design might ben-
efit from contemplating how to plan for an environment of diminished trust 
in centralized management or in the firm itself as the cost of augmented 
trust in localized management. Is such a trade- off avoidable? Is it possible to 
flip in the other direction—augmented, global, organizational trust in ex-
change for decreased, localized trust for effective and fair dispute resolu-
tion? Finally, this research raises important questions about the relationship 
between organizational commitment and procedural justice. These and 
other questions emerging from this study deserve continued attention given 
the vast number of organizations contemplating implementation of a DRS, 
often without knowledge of the trade- offs this study uncovers.
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